Optimality and stability of symmetric evolutionary games with applications in genetic selection
DOI10.3934/MBE.2015.12.503zbMATH Open1322.49041OpenAlexW2087699432WikidataQ38391858 ScholiaQ38391858MaRDI QIDQ2339916FDOQ2339916
Authors: Yiping Hao, Min Wang, Wen Zhou, Yuanyuan Huang, Zhijun Wu
Publication date: 14 April 2015
Published in: Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/mbe.2015.12.503
Recommendations
optimalitypopulation geneticsevolutionary biologyevolutionary gamesevolutionary stabilitygenetic selectiongeneralized knapsack problems
Numerical optimization and variational techniques (65K10) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Optimality conditions for solutions belonging to restricted classes (Lipschitz controls, bang-bang controls, etc.) (49K30) Sensitivity, stability, well-posedness (49K40) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cited In (7)
- Equilibrium distributions of populations of biological species on networks of social sites
- Population games and discrete optimal transport
- Surrounding information consideration promotes cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An example of dynamic (in)consistency in symmetric extensive form evolutionary games
- Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
- On the preservation of cooperation in two-strategy games with nonlocal interactions
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