Evolutionarily Robust Strategies: Two Nontrivial Examples and a Theorem

DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_19MaRDI QIDQ3646720zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. J. Shaiju, Pierre Bernhard

Publication date 27 November 2009

Published in Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4834-3_19

zbMATH Keywords

Darwinian dynamicsESSevolutionary gamesreplicator dynamicsstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

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Cites work

• Cross entropy minimization in uninvadable states of complex populations
• Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 835835 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models.
• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(10)

• Robustness of optimal mixed strategies
• General conditions for strategy abundance through a self-referential mechanism under weak selection
• Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
• A dynamic game approach to uninvadable strategies for biotrophic pathogens
• On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games
• Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
• An extension of the classification of evolutionarily singular strategies in adaptive dynamics
• Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games
• Robustness against indirect invasions in asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces
• Asymmetric replicator dynamics on Polish spaces: invariance, stability, and convergence

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