Average abundancy of cooperation in multi-player games with random payoffs

DOI10.1007/S00285-022-01789-1MaRDI QIDQ2673876zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dhaker Kroumi, Sabin Lessard

Publication date 21 September 2022

Published in Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.11930

zbMATH Keywords

Dirichlet distributionevolution of cooperationMoran modelmutation-selection equilibriumpublic goods gamesnowdrift gamestag hunt game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: We consider interactions between players in groups of size $dgeq2$ with payoffs that not only depend on the strategies used in the group but also fluctuate at random over time. An individual can adopt either cooperation or defection as strategy and the population is updated from one-time step to the next by a birth-death event according to a Moran model. Assuming recurrent symmetric mutation and payoffs with expected values, variances, and covariances of the same small order, we derive a first-order approximation of the average abundance of cooperation in the selection-mutation equilibrium. We show that increasing the variance of any payoff for defection or decreasing the variance of any payoff for cooperation increases the average abundance of cooperation. As for the effect of the covariance between any payoff for cooperation and any payoff for defection, we show that it depends on the number of cooperators in the group associated with these payoffs. We study in particular the public goods game, the stag hunt game, and the snowdrift game, all social dilemmas based on random benefit $b$ and cost $c$ for cooperation. We show that a decrease in the scaled variance of $b$ or $c$, or an increase in their scaled covariance, makes it easier for weak selection to favor the abundance of cooperation in the stag hunt game and the snowdrift game. The same conclusion holds for the public goods game except that the covariance of $b$ has no effect on the average abundance of $C$. On the other hand, increasing the scaled mutation rate or the group size can enhance or lessen the condition for weak selection to favor the abundance of $C$.

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Cited in

(12)

• Public goods games in populations with fluctuating size
• Effect of variability in payoffs on conditions for the evolution of cooperation in a small population
• Average abundance function of multi-player threshold public goods without initial endowment evolutionary game model under differential aspiration levels and redistribution mechanism
• Evolution of cooperation with respect to fixation probabilities in multi-player games with random payoffs
• The average abundance function with mutation of the multi-player snowdrift evolutionary game model
• The effect of variability in payoffs on average abundance in two-player linear games under symmetric mutation
• The characteristics of average abundance function of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism
• Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games
• Evolutionary game with stochastic payoffs in a finite island model
• The role of selective extinction in promoting cooperation in a many demes model
• Stochastic viability in an island model with partial dispersal: approximation by a diffusion process in the limit of a large number of islands
• Cooperation driven by mutations in multi-person prisoner's dilemma

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