Cooperation driven by mutations in multi-person prisoner's dilemma

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2004.08.020zbMATH Open1442.91010arXivq-bio/0408021OpenAlexW2158432603WikidataQ50985428 ScholiaQ50985428MaRDI QIDQ776523FDOQ776523

Authors: Kristian Lindgren, Anders Eriksson 

Publication date: 9 July 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The n-person Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be considered as isolated events. For this case, and assuming simple trigger strategies and many iterations per game, we analyse the rate of convergence to the evolutionarily stable populations. We find that for some values of the payoff parameters of the Prisoner's Dilemma this rate is so low that the assumption, that mutations in the population are infrequent on that timescale, is unreasonable. Furthermore, the problem is compounded as the group size is increased. In order to address this issue, we derive a deterministic approximation of the evolutionary dynamics with explicit, stochastic mutation processes, valid when the population size is large. We then analyse how the evolutionary dynamics depends on the following factors: mutation rate, group size, the value of the payoff parameters, and the structure of the initial population. In order to carry out the simulations for groups of more than just a few individuals, we derive an efficient way of calculating the fitness values. We find that when the mutation rate per individual and generation is very low, the dynamics is characterised by populations which are evolutionarily stable. As the mutation rate is increased, other fixed points with a higher degree of cooperation become stable. For some values of the payoff parameters, the system is characterised by (apparently) stable limit cycles dominated by cooperative behaviour. The parameter regions corresponding to high degree of cooperation grow in size with the mutation rate, and in number with the group size.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/q-bio/0408021

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsprisoner's dilemma\(n\)-person

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited In (13)

• The dependency game: multiperson reciprocal sharing leads to stable cooperation which can evolve into group formation
• Average abundance function of multi-player threshold public goods without initial endowment evolutionary game model under differential aspiration levels and redistribution mechanism
• A non-local rare mutations model for quasispecies and prisoner's dilemma: numerical assessment of qualitative behaviour
• Study on cooperative mechanism of prefabricated producers based on evolutionary game theory
• The average abundance function with mutation of the multi-player snowdrift evolutionary game model
• The characteristics of average abundance function of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism
• Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
• Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility
• Melioration learning in iterated public goods games: The impact of exploratory noise
• Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
• When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation?
• Cooperation in two-person evolutionary games with complex personality profiles
• Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in \(n\)-person games

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