Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
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Cites work
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- Cooperation driven by mutations in multi-person prisoner's dilemma
- Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
- Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
- Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
- The evolution of norms
- The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
- The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity
- The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
- Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
Cited in
(26)- Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
- Learning to cooperate via indirect reciprocity
- Matrix-based method for the analysis and control of networked evolutionary games: a survey
- Dynamic noise from action errors enhances network reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Stability and stabilization of a class of finite evolutionary games
- Revisiting: ``The evolution of reciprocity in sizable groups: continuous reciprocity in the repeated \(n\)-person prisoner's dilemma
- Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game
- Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions and private information
- Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in \(n\)-person games
- The evolution of reciprocity in sizable human groups
- On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information
- Stability and stabilization of evolutionary games with time delays via matrix method
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
- Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
- Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
- Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
- Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas
- Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring
- Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
- Numerical and analytical study of evolution of indirect reciprocity
- Vector space structure of finite evolutionary games and its application to strategy profile convergence
- Ingroup favoritism and intergroup cooperation under indirect reciprocity based on group reputation
- Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game
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