Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2007.12.005zbMath1210.92031OpenAlexW2095239468WikidataQ47944671 ScholiaQ47944671MaRDI QIDQ615461

Eizo Akiyama, Shinsuke Suzuki

Publication date: 5 January 2011

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2241/99610

zbMATH Keywords

ESSreputationindirect reciprocity\(n\)-person prisoner's dilemmaimage scoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (11)

Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors ⋮ Vector space structure of finite evolutionary games and its application to strategy profile convergence ⋮ Indirect reciprocity in three types of social dilemmas ⋮ Complexity of behavioural strategies and cooperation in the optional public goods game ⋮ Stability and stabilization of evolutionary games with time delays via matrix method ⋮ Dynamic noise from action errors enhances network reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game ⋮ Stability and stabilization of a class of finite evolutionary games ⋮ Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient? ⋮ Oscillatory dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility ⋮ Chaos, oscillation and the evolution of indirect reciprocity in \(n\)-person games ⋮ On the stability of cooperation under indirect reciprocity with first-order information

Cites Work

• Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses
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• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity
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• The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity
• The evolution of norms
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• Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity
• Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring

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