Stability and stabilization of a class of finite evolutionary games
DOI10.1016/j.jfranklin.2016.12.007zbMath1355.93142OpenAlexW2565953397MaRDI QIDQ508360
Publication date: 10 February 2017
Published in: Journal of the Franklin Institute (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfranklin.2016.12.007
stabilizationglobal stabilityfinite evolutionary gamesLyapunov-based techniqueMarkov-type evolutionary games (MtEGs)
Lyapunov and storage functions (93D30) Lyapunov and other classical stabilities (Lagrange, Poisson, (L^p, l^p), etc.) in control theory (93D05) Stochastic stability in control theory (93E15) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)
Related Items (13)
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