Stable games and their dynamics

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.01.007zbMath1175.91036OpenAlexW2027163871MaRDI QIDQ2271376

Publication date: 7 August 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.01.007

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategies global stability Lyapunov functions evolutionary dynamics population games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Mathematical geography and demography (91D20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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