scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3062452
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Publication:5801629
zbMath0041.25502MaRDI QIDQ5801629
G. W. Brown, Johann von Neumann
Publication date: 1950
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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