The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.002zbMath1152.91355OpenAlexW2038029392MaRDI QIDQ2519486

William H. Sandholm, Ratul Lahkar

Publication date: 26 January 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

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