The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games
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Publication:2519486
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.02.002zbMATH Open1152.91355OpenAlexW2038029392MaRDI QIDQ2519486FDOQ2519486
Authors: Ratul Lahkar, William H. Sandholm
Publication date: 26 January 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.002
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Cited In (40)
- Tributes to Bill Sandholm
- Finite composite games: equilibria and dynamics
- Gradient dynamics in population games: some basic results
- An evolutionary analysis of growth and fluctuations with negative externalities
- Technology choice in an evolutionary oligopoly game
- Population games and discrete optimal transport
- Dynamic stability of the set of Nash equilibria in stable stochastic games
- Evolution of theories of mind
- Riemannian game dynamics
- The target projection dynamic
- The generic uniqueness and well-posedness of Nash equilibria for stable population games
- Stability of equilibria for population games with uncertain parameters under bounded rationality
- A class of evolutionary models for participation games with negative feedback
- Fitness landscapes among many options under social influence
- Inertial game dynamics and applications to constrained optimization
- Infection and immunization: a new class of evolutionary game dynamics
- Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior
- Stability of weakly Pareto-Nash equilibria and Pareto-Nash equilibria for multiobjective population games
- Nonsmooth dynamics of generalized Nash games
- Competitive equilibria and benefit distributions of population production economies with external increasing returns
- Large population aggregative potential games
- Lyapunov functions for time-scale dynamics on Riemannian geometries of the simplex
- Stable games and their dynamics
- Learning in games via reinforcement and regularization
- Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary foundations for Nash equilibrium
- On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations
- Evolutionary game theory
- Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics
- The replicator dynamics of generalized Nash games
- Continuous time learning algorithms in optimization and game theory
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- Growth, agglomeration, and urban congestion
- On evolutionary ray-projection dynamics
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- The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic
- Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Q-learning for Markov decision processes with a satisfiability criterion
- No-regret algorithms in on-line learning, games and convex optimization
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