Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary foundations for Nash equilibrium
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Publication:2344924
DOI10.3390/g1010003zbMath1311.91034OpenAlexW2144905124MaRDI QIDQ2344924
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1010003
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