Dynamics in atomic signaling games
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Publication:327123
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.038zbMath1353.91011arXiv1312.5983OpenAlexW1991471729WikidataQ87095602 ScholiaQ87095602MaRDI QIDQ327123
Behrouz Touri, Jeff S. Shamma, Michael J. Fox
Publication date: 19 October 2016
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1312.5983
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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