Finite populations choose an optimal language

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.08.009zbMath1454.91163OpenAlexW2138874443WikidataQ81373504 ScholiaQ81373504MaRDI QIDQ2216359

Christina Pawlowitsch

Publication date: 15 December 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.08.009

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityMoran processlanguage evolutionfixation probabilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Linguistics (91F20)

Related Items

Dynamics in atomic signaling games, Non trivial coexistence conditions for a model of language competition obtained by bifurcation theory, One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations, Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games

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