Finite populations choose an optimal language
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2216359
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2007.08.009zbMATH Open1454.91163OpenAlexW2138874443WikidataQ81373504 ScholiaQ81373504MaRDI QIDQ2216359FDOQ2216359
Authors: Christina Pawlowitsch 
Publication date: 15 December 2020
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.08.009
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
- The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
- Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game
- Language dynamics in finite populations
- On evolutionarily stable sets
- Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
- Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
Cited In (11)
- Information theoretic models in language evolution
- Neutral stability, drift, and the diversification of languages
- Optimal language policy for the preservation of a minority language
- Dynamics in atomic signaling games
- One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
- Information Theoretic Models in Language Evolution
- Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games
- Parent oriented teacher selection causes language diversity
- Effects of population structure on the evolution of linguistic convention
- Language dynamics in finite populations
- Non trivial coexistence conditions for a model of language competition obtained by bifurcation theory
This page was built for publication: Finite populations choose an optimal language
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2216359)
