Finite populations choose an optimal language
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Cites work
- Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
- Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
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- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43585 (Why is no real title available?)
- Language dynamics in finite populations
- Nash equilibria for an evolutionary language game
- On evolutionarily stable sets
- The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
Cited in
(11)- Parent oriented teacher selection causes language diversity
- Neutral stability, drift, and the diversification of languages
- One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
- Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games
- Effects of population structure on the evolution of linguistic convention
- Language dynamics in finite populations
- Optimal language policy for the preservation of a minority language
- Dynamics in atomic signaling games
- Information theoretic models in language evolution
- Non trivial coexistence conditions for a model of language competition obtained by bifurcation theory
- Information Theoretic Models in Language Evolution
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