One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.009zbMath1400.92359OpenAlexW2147934054WikidataQ41773460 ScholiaQ41773460MaRDI QIDQ1797596

Christina Pawlowitsch, Immanuel M. Bomze

Publication date: 22 October 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2627408

zbMATH Keywords

language gamesfixation probabilitiescommon interest gamesfrequency-dependent Moran process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (7)

Strategy abundance in \(2\times 2\) games for arbitrary mutation rates ⋮ Strategy selection in structured populations ⋮ From genes to games: cooperation and cyclic dominance in meiotic drive ⋮ The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory ⋮ Local replicator dynamics: a simple link between deterministic and stochastic models of evolutionary game theory ⋮ Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ The \(\sigma\) law of evolutionary dynamics in community-structured population

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