One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
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Publication:1797596
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.009zbMath1400.92359WikidataQ41773460 ScholiaQ41773460MaRDI QIDQ1797596
Christina Pawlowitsch, Immanuel M. Bomze
Publication date: 22 October 2018
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2627408
92D15: Problems related to evolution
92D25: Population dynamics (general)
91A28: Signaling and communication in game theory
91A22: Evolutionary games
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