The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.07.005zbMath1453.92221OpenAlexW2104992036WikidataQ39224569 ScholiaQ39224569MaRDI QIDQ2216303

Martin A. Nowak, Pedro Bordalo, Hisashi Ohtsuki

Publication date: 15 December 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc2430062

zbMATH Keywords

finite populationsojourn timeevolutionary game theoryevolutionary dynamicsfixation probability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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