The law of evolutionary dynamics in community-structured population

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2012.04.024zbMATH Open1397.92516arXiv1204.3966OpenAlexW2079705272WikidataQ50581019 ScholiaQ50581019MaRDI QIDQ1784796FDOQ1784796

Authors: Changbing Tang, Xiang Li, Lang Cao, Jingyuan Zhan 

Publication date: 27 September 2018

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provides a new framework to understand the selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a simple but fundamental law of evolutionary dynamics, which we call {sigma} law, describes how to determine the selection between two competing strategies: in most evolutionary processes with two strategies, A and B, strategy A is favored over B in weak selection if and only if {sigma}R + S > T + {sigma}P. This relationship holds for a wide variety of structured populations with mutation rate and weak selection under certain assumptions. In this paper, we propose a model of games based on a community-structured population and revisit this law under the Moran process. By calculating the average payoffs of A and B individuals with the method of effective sojourn time, we find that {sigma} features not only the structured population characteristics but also the reaction rate between individuals. That's to say, an interaction between two individuals are not uniform, and we can take {sigma} as a reaction rate between any two individuals with the same strategy. We verify this viewpoint by the modified replicator equation with non-uniform interaction rates in a simplified version of the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG).

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1204.3966

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorysojourn timenon-uniform interaction ratesimplified PDG

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited In (6)

• Towards the role of social connectivity and aspiration level on evolutionary game
• Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates in finite population
• Adaptive tag switching reinforces the coevolution of contingent cooperation and tag diversity
• Topological chaos of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game on regular networks
• Strategy selection in evolutionary game dynamics on group interaction networks
• Dynamic properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations

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