The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law

DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0025-4zbMATH Open1252.91022OpenAlexW1985832459MaRDI QIDQ692104FDOQ692104

Authors: Ross Cressman, Yi Tao, Xiu-Deng Zheng 

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0025-4

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zbMATH Keywords

fixation probabilityone-third lawaverage fitnessmean effective fixation time

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Mathematical population genetics. I: Theoretical introduction.
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• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
• The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Continuously stable strategies, neighborhood superiority and two-player games with continuous strategy space
• The Fokker-Planck equation. Methods of solution and applications
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
• Diffusion models in population genetics
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.

Cited In (18)

• Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem
• The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
• Selection intensity and risk-dominant strategy: a two-strategy stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite population
• Weak selection and stochastic evolutionary stability in a stochastic replicator dynamics
• A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
• Fixation probabilities and hitting times for low levels of frequency-dependent selection
• Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates in finite population
• Noise-induced sustainability of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
• On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
• One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
• The \(\sigma\) law of evolutionary dynamics in community-structured population
• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
• The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory
• Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?
• Hamilton's rule and kin competition in a finite kin population
• Conformity and anti-conformity in a finite population
• Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
• Persistence extends reciprocity

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