The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
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- On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
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- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
Cited in
(18)- Weak selection and stochastic evolutionary stability in a stochastic replicator dynamics
- A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Fixation probabilities and hitting times for low levels of frequency-dependent selection
- One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
- The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory
- The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
- The \(\sigma\) law of evolutionary dynamics in community-structured population
- Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem
- Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates in finite population
- Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
- The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
- Noise-induced sustainability of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma game
- Persistence extends reciprocity
- Selection intensity and risk-dominant strategy: a two-strategy stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite population
- Conformity and anti-conformity in a finite population
- Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?
- On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
- Hamilton's rule and kin competition in a finite kin population
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