The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law

DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0025-4zbMath1252.91022OpenAlexW1985832459MaRDI QIDQ692104

Ross Cressman, Yi Tao, Xiu-Deng Zheng

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0025-4

zbMATH Keywords

fixation probabilityone-third lawaverage fitnessmean effective fixation time

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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