Persistence extends reciprocity

DOI10.1016/J.MBS.2017.02.006MaRDI QIDQ518670zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Shun Kurokawa

Publication date 29 March 2017

Published in Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mbs.2017.02.006

zbMATH Keywords

persistencetrade-offevolutionary game theoryimperfect informationinvariant of motioniterated prisoner's dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Cooperative games (91A12) Animal behavior (92D50) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

• The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
• How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
• Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?
• Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators
• Study on persistence of cooperation without reciprocity

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5145291 (Why is no real title available?)
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
• Evolution of social behavior in finite populations: a payoff transformation in general \(n\)-player games and its implications
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolving cooperation
• Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations
• Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem
• Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
• On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
• Payoff non-linearity sways the effect of mistakes on the evolution of reciprocity
• Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
• Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
• The calculus of selfishness.
• The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
• The evolution of cooperation
• The good, the bad and the discriminator -- errors in direct and indirect reciprocity
• Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators

Cited in

(12)

• Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators
• Study on persistence of cooperation without reciprocity
• The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
• Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
• Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
• Ignorance is bliss, but for whom? The persistent effect of good will on cooperation
• Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions
• How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?
• How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence
• Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players
• Imperfect information facilitates the evolution of reciprocity
• Which facilitates the evolution of cooperation more, retaliation or persistence?

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