Ignorance is bliss, but for whom? The persistent effect of good will on cooperation

DOI10.3390/G7040033MaRDI QIDQ725055zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mike Farjam, Wladislaw Mill, Marian Panganiban

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040033

zbMATH Keywords

games on graphsindirect reciprocitystrategic ignorancegood willunconditional cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Recommendations

• Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators
• Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
• Persistence extends reciprocity
• Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
• The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Direct reciprocity on graphs
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary potential games on lattices
• Evolutionary stability on graphs
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• Population persistence and spatially limited social interaction
• Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device
• The importance of being discrete (and spatial)
• The logic of animal conflict
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The replicator equation on graphs
• Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?

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