Ignorance is bliss, but for whom? The persistent effect of good will on cooperation

DOI10.3390/G7040033MaRDI QIDQ725055zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mike Farjam, Wladislaw Mill, Marian Panganiban

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040033

zbMATH Keywords

games on graphsgood willindirect reciprocitystrategic ignoranceunconditional cooperation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04) Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Review text

Summary: Who benefits from the ignorance of others? We address this question from the point of view of a policy maker who can induce some ignorance into a system of agents competing for resources. Evolutionary game theory shows that when unconditional cooperators or ignorant agents compete with defectors in two-strategy settings, unconditional cooperators get exploited and are rendered extinct. In contrast, conditional cooperators, by utilizing some kind of reciprocity, are able to survive and sustain cooperation when competing with defectors. We study how cooperation thrives in a three-strategy setting where there are unconditional cooperators, conditional cooperators and defectors. By means of simulation on various kinds of graphs, we show that conditional cooperators benefit from the existence of unconditional cooperators in the majority of cases. However, in worlds that make cooperation hard to evolve, defectors benefit.

Recommendations

• Unified and simple understanding for the evolution of conditional cooperators
• Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals
• Persistence extends reciprocity
• Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
• The emergence of reciprocally beneficial cooperation

Cites work

• A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
• Direct reciprocity on graphs
• Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary potential games on lattices
• Evolutionary stability on graphs
• How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
• Population persistence and spatially limited social interaction
• Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device
• The importance of being discrete (and spatial)
• The logic of animal conflict
• The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
• The replicator equation on graphs
• Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• NetLogo

This page was built for publication: Ignorance is bliss, but for whom? The persistent effect of good will on cooperation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q725055)