Ignorance is bliss, but for whom? The persistent effect of good will on cooperation
DOI10.3390/G7040033zbMATH Open1406.91010OpenAlexW2543633881MaRDI QIDQ725055FDOQ725055
Authors: Mike Farjam, Wladislaw Mill, Marian Panganiban 
Publication date: 1 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040033
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Cites Work
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The logic of animal conflict
- The importance of being discrete (and spatial)
- Evolutionary game dynamics
- Evolutionary stability on graphs
- A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity
- How should we define goodness? -- reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity
- The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation
- The replicator equation on graphs
- Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
- Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism
- Indirect reciprocity with optional interactions
- Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device
- Evolutionary potential games on lattices
- Population persistence and spatially limited social interaction
- Direct reciprocity on graphs
Uses Software
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