Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00142MaRDI QIDQ4512702zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan D. Carrillo, Thomas Mariotti

Publication date 2000

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00142

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Individual preferences (91B08) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Learning self-control
• Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption
• Preferences under ignorance
• Strategic investment and learning with private information
• Strategic learning in games with symmetric information.

Cited in

(27)

• Motivated memory in dictator games
• Commitment through risk
• Information avoidance in school choice
• Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
• Hyperbolic discounting and secondary markets.
• Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
• Decisions with endogenous frames
• Second-best probability weighting
• Ignorance is bliss, but for whom? The persistent effect of good will on cooperation
• The impact of health-related emotions on belief formation and behavior
• Self-control in peer groups
• Testing models of belief bias: an experiment
• Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism
• Strategic ignorance and procedural fairness preferences
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
• Learning self-control
• Utility from anticipation and personal equilibrium
• Limited cognitive ability and selective information processing
• Value computation and modulation: a neuroeconomic theory of self-control as constrained optimization
• ESTIMATING DYNAMIC DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS WITH HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING, WITH AN APPLICATION TO MAMMOGRAPHY DECISIONS
• Feigning ignorance for long-term gains
• Performance of procrastinators: On the value of deadlines
• Memory recall bias of overconfident and underconfident individuals after feedback
• Can anticipatory feelings explain anomalous choices of information sources?
• This is how we do it: how social norms and social identity shape decision making under uncertainty
• Feedback spillovers across tasks, self-confidence and competitiveness
• How innocuous is it to approximate globally decreasing impatience with quasi-hyperbolic discounting?

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