Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.07.001zbMATH Open1302.91058OpenAlexW3123011090MaRDI QIDQ485801FDOQ485801

Authors: Masaki Aoyagi Edit this on Wikidata

Publication date: 14 January 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23381

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zbMATH Keywords

disclosuretransparencyendogenous informationsignal qualityspecific investmentstrategic ignorance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Contracts with endogenous information
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Ignorance in agency problems
• Arm's Length Relationships
• Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters

Cited In (2)

• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters

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