Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.07.001MaRDI QIDQ485801zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Masaki Aoyagi

Publication date 14 January 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/23381

zbMATH Keywords

disclosureendogenous informationsignal qualityspecific investmentstrategic ignorancetransparency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Decision theory (91B06) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Disclosure and choice
• The strategically ignorant principal
• Information acquisition and the value of bad news
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• Optimal disclosure policy and undue diligence

Cites work

• Arm's Length Relationships
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Contracts with endogenous information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4014390 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ignorance in agency problems
• Information structures in optimal auctions
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Strategic Ignorance as a Self-Disciplining Device
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• The Economics of Clear Advice and Extreme Options

Cited in

(2)

• Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
• Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition

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