Ignorance in agency problems
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Publication:688910
DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1064zbMATH Open0779.90020OpenAlexW2022567233MaRDI QIDQ688910FDOQ688910
Authors: Tracy R. Lewis, David E. M. Sappington 
Publication date: 1 November 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1064
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Cited In (17)
- Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information
- The irreversibility effect and agency conflicts
- Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
- The use of an agent in a signalling model
- Collaborative product development: managing supplier incentives for key component testing
- Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models
- The value of information for auctioneers
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Pessimistic information gathering
- Information acquisition and countervailing incentives
- Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters
- Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models
- Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering
- GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT
- Adverse selection under ignorance
- MISUSE AND OPTIMUM INSPECTING STRATEGY IN AGENCY PROBLEMS
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