Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information

DOI10.1007/S00291-010-0212-5MaRDI QIDQ538480zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sabine Böckem, Ulf D. Schiller

Publication date 25 May 2011

Published in OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://doc.rero.ch/record/312986/files/291_2010_Article_212.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

limited liquiditysupplier creditsupply-chain contracttimeliness of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
• Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Ignorance in agency problems
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer

Cited in

(1)

• Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Backup Production Option

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