Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information

DOI10.1007/S00291-010-0212-5zbMATH Open1222.91032OpenAlexW2104553198MaRDI QIDQ538480FDOQ538480

Authors: Sabine Böckem, Ulf D. Schiller 

Publication date: 25 May 2011

Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://doc.rero.ch/record/312986/files/291_2010_Article_212.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

limited liquiditysupplier creditsupply-chain contracttimeliness of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)

Cites Work

• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Contracting to assure supply: how to share demand forecasts in a supply chain
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Ignorance in agency problems
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Optimal contracting with private knowledge of wealth and ability
• Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation

Cited In (1)

• Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Backup Production Option

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