scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5583352

zbMATH Open1174.91556MaRDI QIDQ5318804FDOQ5318804

Authors: Liping Yu, Xiaoyuan Huang, Lijun Li 

Publication date: 22 July 2009

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationprincipal-agentsupply chainsymmetric informationtrade credit incentive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (11)

• Trade credit: a new mechanism to coordinate supply chain
• Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information
• Reputation compensation for incentive alignment in a supply chain with trade credit under information asymmetry
• The informational role of guarantee contracts
• The manufacturer contract design with asymmetric information
• Trade credit and information leakage in a supply chain with competing retailers
• Trade credit contract in the presence of retailer investment opportunity
• Incentive contract in supply chain with asymmetric information
• The incentive model in supply chain with trade credit and default risk
• Incentive contract in supply chain trade credit under asymmetric information
• Optimal decision of deferred payment supply chain considering bilateral risk-aversion degree

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