Informed principal model and contract in supply chain with demand disruption asymmetric information

DOI10.1155/2016/2306583zbMath1400.90053OpenAlexW2462662761WikidataQ59131119 ScholiaQ59131119MaRDI QIDQ1792818

Huan Zhang, Jianli Jiang

Publication date: 12 October 2018

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2016/2306583

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Cites Work

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