The use of an agent in a signalling model

DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1036zbMATH Open0772.90025OpenAlexW2128503186MaRDI QIDQ1802037FDOQ1802037

Authors: Bernard Caillaud, Benjamin Hermalin 

Publication date: 8 August 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9136.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

agency problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Cited In (2)

• A signaling approach to soft budgets
• Are two a good representative for many?

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