The use of an agent in a signalling model

DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1036MaRDI QIDQ1802037zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bernard Caillaud, Benjamin Hermalin

Publication date 8 August 1993

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cepremap.fr/depot/couv_orange/co9136.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

agency problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

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(2)

• Are two a good representative for many?
• A signaling approach to soft budgets

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