Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
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Publication:1268588
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2415zbMath0910.90104OpenAlexW3124153996MaRDI QIDQ1268588
Fahad Khalil, Jean-Charles Rochet, Jacques Crémer
Publication date: 13 December 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2415
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Related Items (32)
GATHERING INFORMATION BY A PARTIALLY INFORMED AGENT ⋮ Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract ⋮ The value of information for auctioneers ⋮ Wholesale-price contract of supply chain with information gathering ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation ⋮ A note on robust procurement contracts ⋮ Collaborative product development: managing supplier incentives for key component testing ⋮ Information acquisition and full surplus extraction ⋮ Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework ⋮ ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN ⋮ Signaling covertly acquired information ⋮ Quantum contracts between Schrödinger and a cat ⋮ Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design ⋮ Information acquisition and countervailing incentives ⋮ When is knowledge acquisition socially beneficial in the Laffont-Tirole regulatory framework? ⋮ Ex-ante licensing in sequential innovations ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous information ⋮ Information provision before a contract is offered ⋮ Strategic obscurity in the forecasting of disasters ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures ⋮ Pre-trade private investments ⋮ Endogenous information and stochastic contracts ⋮ Auctions with costly information acquisition ⋮ Contracts with endogenous information ⋮ Contracts and productive information gathering ⋮ Informed principal and information gathering agent ⋮ Optimal auctions with information acquisition ⋮ Try before you buy: a theory of dynamic information acquisition ⋮ Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability ⋮ Ignorance in a multi-agent setting ⋮ Pessimistic information gathering
Cites Work
- Ignorance in agency problems
- All-or-nothing information control
- The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- Input versus output monitoring: Who is the residual claimant?
- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Choosing Workers' Qualifications: No Experience Necessary?
- Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
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