Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered

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Publication:1268588

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2415zbMath0910.90104OpenAlexW3124153996MaRDI QIDQ1268588

Fahad Khalil, Jean-Charles Rochet, Jacques Crémer

Publication date: 13 December 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2415



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