Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1934941
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.026zbMath1255.91227OpenAlexW3122286895MaRDI QIDQ1934941
Publication date: 29 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.026
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Cites Work
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
- Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?