Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2008.08.026MaRDI QIDQ1934941zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Patrick W. Schmitz

Publication date 29 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.026

zbMATH Keywords

complete contractinghold-up probleminformation gathering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
• Pessimistic information gathering

Cites work

• After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
• Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts

Cited in

(5)

• Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
• Pessimistic information gathering
• Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract
• Informational hold up and intermediaries
• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

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