On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
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Publication:1601456
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2790zbMath1010.91045OpenAlexW3122321432WikidataQ29999510 ScholiaQ29999510MaRDI QIDQ1601456
Publication date: 26 June 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2790
Related Items
Subjective evaluation versus public information ⋮ Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information ⋮ Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework ⋮ Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information ⋮ Investment incentives in bilateral trading ⋮ Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Hidden action and outcome contractibility: an experimental test of moral hazard theory ⋮ Two-sided unobservable investment, bargaining, and efficiency
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