Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
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Publication:4290971
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(31)- Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: results on the technology of trade and investment
- Credible implementation
- Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem
- Knowledge accumulation within an organization
- Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts
- The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup
- On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship
- Search equilibrium with unobservable investment
- Intrinsic impediments to category captainship collaboration
- Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
- Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
- After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
- Noncontractible investments and reference points
- The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
- Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain
- Holdup, search, and inefficiency
- If you are offered the right of first refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design
- Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
- The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
- Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
- Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
- Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
- Trade disputes and settlement
- Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract flexibility and investment
- Efficient investments in the implementation problem
- Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment
- Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market
- On efficient firm formation
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