Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information

DOI10.2307/2951613zbMATH Open0799.90042OpenAlexW2170478564MaRDI QIDQ4290971FDOQ4290971

Authors: Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Rey 

Publication date: 17 November 1994

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/1905/1/renegotiation_design.pdf

Recommendations

• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts

zbMATH Keywords

investmentrisk-sharingincomplete contractscontract renegotiationunverifiable informationbuyer-seller relationshipRubinstein bargaining games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (27)

• Credible implementation
• Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem
• Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts
• The dynamics of productive assets, contract duration and holdup
• Search equilibrium with unobservable investment
• On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship
• Intrinsic impediments to category captainship collaboration
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
• Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
• After you Sir. Hold-up, direct externalities, and sequential investment
• KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION
• The middleman as a panacea for supply chain coordination problems
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
• Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain
• Holdup, search, and inefficiency
• If you are offered the right of first refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design
• The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
• Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness
• Contractual signaling, relationship-specific investment and exclusive agreements
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
• Implications of renegotiation for optimal contract flexibility and investment
• Efficient investments in the implementation problem
• Renegotiation-proof contracting, disclosure, and incentives for efficient investment
• On efficient firm formation
• Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market

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