Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.12.001zbMATH Open1330.91114OpenAlexW2047084769MaRDI QIDQ894072FDOQ894072

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/247289

Recommendations

• The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
• Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentmechanism designcontractrenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Game theory
• Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Auction Design
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
• Posterior efficiency
• Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation

Cited In (8)

• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• Contract design and bargaining power
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts

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