Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 605729 (Why is no real title available?)
- A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
- Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
- Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
- Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
- Game theory
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
- Posterior efficiency
- Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Strategic Information Transmission
- The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
Cited in
(13)- Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
- Contract design and bargaining power
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
- The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
- Renegotiation-proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
- The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
- Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
- Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
- Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
- Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
- Optimal auction design under non-commitment
- Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
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