Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.12.001MaRDI QIDQ894072zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors N. E. Zubov

Publication date 23 November 2015

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/247289

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentmechanism designcontractrenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
• Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
• Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 605729 (Why is no real title available?)
• A direct mechanism characterization of sequential bargaining with one- sided incomplete information
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal -- agent models
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Ex post renegotiation-proof mechanism design
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
• Game theory
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• Posterior efficiency
• Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
• Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts

Cited in

(13)

• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• Contract design and bargaining power
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Strategic effects of renegotiation-proof contracts
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
• Renegotiation-proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification
• The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
• Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
• Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
• Competing Vertical Structures: Precommitment and Renegotiation
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts

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