Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
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Publication:894072
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2014.12.001zbMath1330.91114OpenAlexW2047084769MaRDI QIDQ894072
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/247289
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Cites Work
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