Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
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Publication:4262865
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(36)- Comments on: ``Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications
- Critical decisions and constitutional rules
- Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations
- Satisficing contracts
- Does evolution solve the hold-up problem?
- Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature
- Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: a biform-game analysis
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- A characterization of verifiability and observability in contracts
- On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
- Explicating the mediating role of integrative supply management practices in strategic outsourcing: a case study analysis
- Learning in a credit economy
- Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
- Trust management for \(e\)-transactions
- On efficient firm formation
- Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
- INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
- Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
- When should the government own the physical assets needed to provide public goods?
- On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
- Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
- Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
- Technology driven organizational structure of the firm
- Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness
- Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
- Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem
- Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
- Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage
- Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered
- Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
- A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement
- Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership
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