Foundations of Incomplete Contracts
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Publication:4262865
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00080zbMath0947.91054WikidataQ56028807 ScholiaQ56028807MaRDI QIDQ4262865
John Hardman Moore, Oliver D. Hart
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Explicating the mediating role of integrative supply management practices in strategic outsourcing: a case study analysis ⋮ A Characterization of Verifiability and Observability in Contracts ⋮ Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments ⋮ Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information ⋮ Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage ⋮ Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information ⋮ Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation ⋮ Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances. ⋮ On efficient firm formation ⋮ INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING ⋮ Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach ⋮ Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information ⋮ The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability ⋮ Critical decisions and constitutional rules ⋮ Technology driven organizational structure of the firm ⋮ Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations ⋮ Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms ⋮ Comments on: ``Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications ⋮ Does evolution solve the hold-up problem? ⋮ Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness ⋮ Learning in a credit economy ⋮ Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm ⋮ On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries ⋮ Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: a biform-game analysis ⋮ Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm ⋮ Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership ⋮ Trust management for \(e\)-transactions ⋮ Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999) ⋮ Competition with nonexclusive contracts: tackling the hold-up problem ⋮ Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered ⋮ On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
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