Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
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Publication:1782397
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.07.026zbMATH Open1396.91349OpenAlexW2741749699MaRDI QIDQ1782397FDOQ1782397
Authors: Patrick W. Schmitz
Publication date: 20 September 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.026
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Cites Work
Cited In (11)
- Optimal ownership of entrepreneurial firms with rational inattention
- Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory
- A Nobel Prize for property rights theory
- On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries
- \textit{Ex ante} investment, \textit{ex post} adaptation, and joint ownership
- Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights
- Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach
- Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
- ANNIVERSARY ARTICLE: A Perspective on “Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation”
- Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
- Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
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