A Nobel Prize for property rights theory

DOI10.3390/G8010004MaRDI QIDQ725076zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard T. Holden

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g8010004

zbMATH Keywords

contractsfirmsincomplete contractsproperty-rights theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Review text

Summary: This article provides a brief overview of the property-rights theory of the firm, pioneered by \textit{S. J. Grossman} and \textit{O. D. Hart} [``The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration, J. Polit. Econ. 94, No. 4, 691--719 (1986; \url{doi:10.1086/261404})] and \textit{O. Hart} and \textit{J. Moore} [Econometrica 56, No. 4, 755--785 (1988; Zbl 0644.90011)], and situates the theory in other literatures.

Recommendations

• Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
• Does Asset Ownership Always Motivate Managers? Outside Options and the Property Rights Theory of the Firm
• Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068856 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• VALUATION EQUILIBRIUM AND PARETO OPTIMUM

Cited in

(3)

• A Nobel prize for John Nash
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1377034 (Why is no real title available?)
• The Legacy of Gary Stanley Becker, 1992 Economy's Nobel Prize

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