Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
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Publication:4262863
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00078zbMATH Open0944.91035OpenAlexW2161306963MaRDI QIDQ4262863FDOQ4262863
Authors: I. R. Segal' 
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00078
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- Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage
- Contract negotiation and the Coase conjecture: a strategic foundation for renegotiation-proof contracts
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- Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments
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- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
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