Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4262863
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00078zbMATH Open0944.91035OpenAlexW2161306963MaRDI QIDQ4262863FDOQ4262863
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00078
Cited In (14)
- Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations
- Indescribability and its irrelevance for contractual incompleteness
- Limited observability as a constraint in contract design
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Incomplete contracts with disparity, uncertainty, information and incentives
- Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage
- Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
- Technology, team production and incentives
- Can a contract solve hold-up when investments have externalities? A comment on De Fraja (1999)
- Coordination and learning with a partial language
- Delegation in vertical relationships: the role of reciprocity
- On efficient firm formation
- Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: an experimental study
- INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS MODELLING
Recommendations
This page was built for publication: Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4262863)