Incomplete contract, bargaining and optimal divisional structure

DOI10.1007/S00712-011-0258-0zbMATH Open1294.91059OpenAlexW2125106326MaRDI QIDQ405779FDOQ405779

Authors: Te Bao, Yongqin Wang 

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0258-0

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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingdivisional structureincomplete contractorganizational design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)

Cites Work

• Authority and Communication in Organizations
• The organization of supplier networks: effects of delegation and intermediation.
• Task assignment and organizational form
• Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents
• Leadership Style and Incentives
• Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
• The Firm as a Communication Network

Cited In (1)

• Diversification or splitting -- an explanation based on contract theory

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