Incomplete contract, bargaining and optimal divisional structure

DOI10.1007/s00712-011-0258-0zbMath1294.91059OpenAlexW2125106326MaRDI QIDQ405779

Te Bao, Yongqin Wang

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0258-0

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingdivisional structureincomplete contractorganizational design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

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