A bargaining theory of the firm
DOI10.1007/S00199-012-0721-3zbMATH Open1281.91108OpenAlexW2138019333MaRDI QIDQ372367FDOQ372367
Authors: Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski 
Publication date: 7 October 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/64767744/herings_2013_a_bargaining_theory_of_the_firm.pdf
Recommendations
equilibriumincompletenessstock marketnoncooperative bargainingside-paymentsproduction plantransfer scheme
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
Cites Work
- Convex Analysis
- Bargaining and Value
- Incomplete markets over an infinite horizon: Long-lived securities and speculative bubbles
- Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution
- A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market
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- Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets
- Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
- Power and Taxes
- A Theory of Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies
- Nonexistence of Constrained Efficient Equilibria When Markets are Incomplete
- Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete
Cited In (11)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Incomplete contract, bargaining and optimal divisional structure
- Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility
- Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach
- Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate
- A formal model of firm boundaries and haggling
- Differential bargaining games as microfoundations for production function
- General economic equilibrium with financial markets and retainability
- Nonexistence of constrained efficient production plans
- Drèze equilibria and welfare maxima
- Objectives of an enterprise. Bi-criteria analysis and negotiation problems
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