Negotiating a voluntary agreement when firms self-regulate

DOI10.1016/J.JEEM.2011.03.002zbMATH Open1217.91094OpenAlexW1996603602MaRDI QIDQ553497FDOQ553497

Authors: Pierre Fleckinger, Matthieu Glachant 

Publication date: 27 July 2011

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.03.002

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zbMATH Keywords

self-regulationnegotiationregulation preemptionvoluntary agreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Voluntary environmental agreements: Good or bad news for environmental protection?
• Non-binding voluntary agreements

Cited In (6)

• Voluntary regulation: evidence from medicare payment reform
• Self-Regulation and Government Oversight
• Non-binding voluntary agreements
• The social welfare implications of industry self-auditing
• Private politics and public regulation
• On the incentive for a self-interested policymaker to mimic the behavior of a social-welfare maximizer

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