On the incentive for a self-interested policymaker to mimic the behavior of a social-welfare maximizer

DOI10.1007/978-981-10-8615-1_10MaRDI QIDQ3298239zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Masayuki Hayashibara, Takao Ohkawa, Ryoichi Nomura, Makoto Okamura

Publication date 14 July 2020

Published in New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8615-1_10

zbMATH Keywords

benevolent policymakerpartial disguisesurface objectivetariff and subsidy schemetrue objective

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cites work

• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly

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