Optimal policy intervention, constrained obfuscation and the social value of public information

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.004zbMATH Open1292.91110OpenAlexW2059013766MaRDI QIDQ2452987FDOQ2452987

Authors: Luca Colombo, Gianluca Femminis 

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.004

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zbMATH Keywords

welfareoptimal policypublic informationobfuscation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Efficient Use of Information and Social�Value�of�Information

Cited In (8)

• Information percolation in segmented markets
• The value of public information in majority decisions
• Can public information promote market stability?
• An informational rationale for action over disclosure
• The social value of public information with costly information acquisition
• The social value of public information with convex costs of information acquisition
• The benefit of mixing private noise into public information in beauty contest games
• On the incentive for a self-interested policymaker to mimic the behavior of a social-welfare maximizer

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