The benefit of mixing private noise into public information in beauty contest games

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1694zbMATH Open1277.91116OpenAlexW2018724814MaRDI QIDQ2867451FDOQ2867451

Authors: Hiroki Arato, Tomoya Nakamura 

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1694

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zbMATH Keywords

social welfareinformation structurepublic announcementbeauty contest games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cited In (1)

• Optimal policy intervention, constrained obfuscation and the social value of public information

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