The value of public information in majority decisions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(91)90136-9MaRDI QIDQ2277346zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Gersbach

Publication date 1991

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90136-9

zbMATH Keywords

majority decisionpublic information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Public information and social choice
• Information efficiency and majority decisions
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• The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests
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• The social value of information with an endogenous public signal
• The effect of information on the quality of decisions
• Subjective evaluation versus public information
• The dynamics of public opinion under majority rules
• Optimal policy intervention, constrained obfuscation and the social value of public information

Cites work

• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3399008 (Why is no real title available?)

Cited in

(6)

• How partisan voters fuel the influence of public information
• The social value of public information with costly information acquisition
• Public information: relevance or salience?
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
• Would Economic Democracy Decrease the Amount of Public Bads?
• Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making

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