Power and Taxes

DOI10.2307/1914063MaRDI QIDQ4145348zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Robert J. Aumann, Mordecai Kurz

Publication date 1977

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1914063

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16)

Cited in

(27)

• Why do some good bear higher taxes than others?
• Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases
• A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise
• Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
• Moral sentiments and social choice
• On the intensity of downside risk aversion
• Power and taxes in a multi-commodity economy
• On non-atomic weighted majority games
• Power and public goods
• Voting, bargaining, and factor income distribution
• Fear of ruin
• The impact of changes in relative weights on the optimal solution of a maximization problem
• Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax
• Tax incidence with bargaining
• From aggregate betting data to individual risk preferences
• A bargaining theory of the firm
• Archimedean copulas derived from utility functions
• Repetitive risk aversion
• Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
• Voting and paying for public goods: An application of the theory of the core
• Existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes
• Income inequality and taxation
• Wealth and power in a collegial polity
• CHILD LABOR AND THE EDUCATION OF A SOCIETY
• The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems
• Bargaining and boldness
• The manipulability of the Shapley-value

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