Power and Taxes
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Publication:4145348
DOI10.2307/1914063zbMATH Open0367.90016OpenAlexW1971509156WikidataQ96377851 ScholiaQ96377851MaRDI QIDQ4145348FDOQ4145348
Authors: Robert J. Aumann, Mordecai Kurz 
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914063
Cited In (27)
- Tax incidence with bargaining
- Random-settlement arbitration and the generalized Nash solution: one-shot and infinite-horizon cases
- Existence and uniqueness of ordinal Nash outcomes
- Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax
- Bargaining and boldness
- Income inequality and taxation
- On the intensity of downside risk aversion
- Repetitive risk aversion
- Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
- Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax
- Fear of ruin
- Wealth and power in a collegial polity
- CHILD LABOR AND THE EDUCATION OF A SOCIETY
- Moral sentiments and social choice
- On non-atomic weighted majority games
- Voting and paying for public goods: An application of the theory of the core
- Voting, bargaining, and factor income distribution
- The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems
- Why do some good bear higher taxes than others?
- A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise
- A bargaining theory of the firm
- From aggregate betting data to individual risk preferences
- Power and public goods
- Power and taxes in a multi-commodity economy
- The impact of changes in relative weights on the optimal solution of a maximization problem
- Archimedean copulas derived from utility functions
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