The Firm as a Communication Network
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Publication:4834425
DOI10.2307/2118349zbMath0826.90072OpenAlexW2116982410MaRDI QIDQ4834425
Mathias Dewatripont, Patrick Bolton
Publication date: 30 May 1995
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2118349
Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)
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