Network design in games with spillovers
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Publication:2644690
DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0023-6zbMATH Open1159.91312OpenAlexW3123341401MaRDI QIDQ2644690FDOQ2644690
Authors: Sergio Currarini
Publication date: 3 September 2007
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.unive.it/pag/fileadmin/user_upload/dipartimenti/economia/doc/Pubblicazioni_scientifiche/working_papers/2006/WP_DSE_Currarini_16_01.pdf
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Strongly stable networks
- Allocation rules for network games
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
- The Firm as a Communication Network
- A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
- COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES
Cited In (8)
- On cost sharing mechanisms in the network design game
- Network formation under negative degree-based externalities
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Competition for the access to and use of information in networks
- Network design with weighted players
- Group stability of hierarchies in games with spillovers
- Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks
- Communication network formation with link specificity and value transferability
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