Network design in games with spillovers

DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0023-6zbMath1159.91312OpenAlexW3123341401MaRDI QIDQ2644690

Sergio Currarini

Publication date: 3 September 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.unive.it/pag/fileadmin/user_upload/dipartimenti/economia/doc/Pubblicazioni_scientifiche/working_papers/2006/WP_DSE_Currarini_16_01.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

spilloversnetworksgroup stabilityorganizational design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (4)

Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks ⋮ Competition for the access to and use of information in networks ⋮ Network formation under negative degree-based externalities ⋮ Communication network formation with link specificity and value transferability

Cites Work

• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Strongly stable networks
• Allocation rules for network games
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• The Firm as a Communication Network
• COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES

This page was built for publication: Network design in games with spillovers