Network design with weighted players
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The paper contributes to the network design methods treated by means of tools of the algorithmic games. Selfish players select paths in a network, minimizing their costs which are specified in accordance with Shapley cost shares. For the game with identical players, the cost share incurred by a player for an edge is the fixed cost for each of them. The main results specify the approximation of Nash equilibria, analyze their properties and prove their existence.
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Cites work
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
- Algorithms – ESA 2005
- Algorithms, games, and the internet
- Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079324 (Why is no real title available?)
- Inefficiency of Nash Equilibria
- Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
- On a network creation game
- On nash equilibria for a network creation game
- On the topologies formed by selfish peers
- Potential functions and the inefficiency of equilibria
- Potential games
- Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The network equilibrium problem in integers
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- The price of routing unsplittable flow
- The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- Worst-case equilibria
Cited in
(52)- Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games
- Strategic multiway cut and multicut games
- Non-cooperative queueing games on a network of single server queues
- Timing matters: online dynamics in broadcast games
- The price of stability for undirected broadcast network design with fair cost allocation is constant
- Dynamic resource allocation games
- Network cost-sharing games: equilibrium computation and applications to election modeling
- Geometric spanner games
- Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
- Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
- The warehouse-retailer network design game
- Congestion games with variable demands
- Dynamic resource allocation games
- Network cost-sharing without anonymity
- On the price of stability of undirected multicast games
- Optimal cost sharing for capacitated facility location games
- Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games
- Cost-sharing scheduling games on restricted unrelated machines
- Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
- Hierarchical network formation games
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- Network-formation games with regular objectives
- Tight bounds for cost-sharing in weighted congestion games
- Cost-sharing scheduling games on restricted unrelated machines
- On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games
- The price of matching with metric preferences
- On the value of coordination in network design
- \(\mathcal{NP}\)-hardness of pure Nash equilibrium in scheduling and network design games
- Sensitivity analysis for convex separable optimization over integral polymatroids
- Capacitated network design games with weighted players
- On solutions of a type of network design game
- The ring design game with fair cost allocation
- Dynamics of Profit-Sharing Games
- Computing approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games via best-responses
- Designing networks with good equilibria under uncertainty
- A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares
- The price of stability of weighted congestion games
- Potential games are \textit{necessary} to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games
- Competitive cost sharing with economies of scale
- Equilibria in Multiclass and Multidimensional Atomic Congestion Games
- On the existence of pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
- Cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems
- Cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems
- Cost-sharing games with rank-based utilities
- Characterizing the existence of potential functions in weighted congestion games
- Price of stability in survivable network design
- Equilibrium analysis of customer attraction games
- Existence and complexity of approximate equilibria in weighted congestion games
- Cost-sharing games with rank-based utilities
- Exact and approximate equilibria for optimal group network formation
- Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
- An \(O(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})\) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games
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