Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
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Publication:2345938
DOI10.1007/s00453-013-9845-5zbMath1312.91023arXiv1104.4423MaRDI QIDQ2345938
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kalaitzis, Angelo Fanelli, John E. Augustine
Publication date: 21 May 2015
Published in: Algorithmica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1104.4423
68M10: Network design and communication in computer systems
91A43: Games involving graphs
91A80: Applications of game theory
90B10: Deterministic network models in operations research
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