The price of matching with metric preferences

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_39MaRDI QIDQ3452808zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuval Emek, Tobias Langner, Roger Wattenhofer

Publication date 19 November 2015

Published in Algorithms - ESA 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_39

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(4)

• What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
• Friendship and stable matching
• Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship
• Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship

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