The Price of Matching with Metric Preferences
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Publication:3452808
DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_39zbMath1466.91206OpenAlexW2281395740MaRDI QIDQ3452808
Tobias Langner, Roger Wattenhofer, Yuval Emek
Publication date: 19 November 2015
Published in: Algorithms - ESA 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_39
Related Items (2)
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