The price of matching with metric preferences

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_39zbMATH Open1466.91206OpenAlexW2281395740MaRDI QIDQ3452808FDOQ3452808

Authors: Yuval Emek, Tobias Langner, Roger Wattenhofer 

Publication date: 19 November 2015

Published in: Algorithms - ESA 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_39

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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Cited In (4)

• What price stability? Social welfare in matching markets
• Friendship and stable matching
• Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship
• Truthful facility assignment with resource augmentation: an exact analysis of serial dictatorship

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