Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings for a small stable marriage instance
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Publication:1821125
DOI10.1016/0097-3165(87)90037-9zbMath0616.06009OpenAlexW2003618558MaRDI QIDQ1821125
Paul Leather, Robert W. Irving, Dan Gusfield, Michael E. Saks
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Theory. Series A (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0097-3165(87)90037-9
weak dominancepartial orderfinite distributive latticestable marriage problemmeet-irreduciblespreference list
Partial orders, general (06A06) Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Structure and representation theory of distributive lattices (06D05)
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