A counterexample of size 20 for the problem of finding a 3-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences

DOI10.1016/j.dam.2023.02.020OpenAlexW4323671091WikidataQ124842668 ScholiaQ124842668MaRDI QIDQ2700602

Eh. Yu. Lerner

Publication date: 27 April 2023

Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2023.02.020

zbMATH Keywords

cyclic preferencespreference graph3-dimensional stable matchinggale-Shapley algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Graph theory (05Cxx) Enumerative combinatorics (05Axx)

Cites Work

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