A counterexample of size 20 for the problem of finding a 3-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
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Publication:2700602
DOI10.1016/j.dam.2023.02.020OpenAlexW4323671091WikidataQ124842668 ScholiaQ124842668MaRDI QIDQ2700602
Publication date: 27 April 2023
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2023.02.020
Cites Work
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