Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4286935
DOI10.1287/MOOR.18.4.803zbMATH Open0806.90085OpenAlexW2168987865MaRDI QIDQ4286935FDOQ4286935
Authors: Alvin E. Roth, Uriel G. Rothblum, John H. Vande Vate 
Publication date: 3 May 1994
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.4.803
Recommendations
Linear programming (90C05) Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Matching models (91B68)
Cited In (70)
- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- The price of matching with metric preferences
- Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
- Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-Duality
- Stable matching: An integer programming approach
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
- The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints
- Maximum matchings and popularity
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach
- Integer programming methods to identify Nash equilibrium solutions for platform-based scheduling games
- Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game
- Stable marriages and search frictions
- Stable matching of student-groups to dormitories
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- On a cutting plane heuristic for the stable roommates problem and its applications
- On the set of stable matchings in a bipartite graph
- The Maximum-Weight Stable Matching Problem: Duality and Efficiency
- Polynomial time algorithm for an optimal stable assignment with multiple partners
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
- On stable matchings and flows
- Stable fractional matchings
- A characterization of strongly stable fractional matchings
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the Technion
- Lattice structure of the random stable set in many-to-many matching markets
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents
- On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Canonical monotone decompositions of fractional stable matchings
- Stable matchings and linear programming
- A note on the lattice structure for matching markets via linear programming
- A polynomial-time algorithm for the bistable roommates problem
- On the stable \(b\)-matching polytope.
- Stable matchings and linear inequalities
- Stable allocations and partially ordered sets
- Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
- Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Disjoint stable matchings in linear time
- An enhanced approach for two-sided matching with 2-tuple linguistic multi-attribute preference
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- A note on ex-ante stable lotteries
- Blockers and antiblockers of stable matchings
- Stable matchings of teachers to schools
- Perfect matching interdiction problem restricted to a stable vertex
- Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
- Jointly stable matchings
- Linear programming brings marital bliss
- Polyhedral aspects of stable marriage
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems
- On Vertices and Facets of Combinatorial 2-Level Polytopes
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
- The stable \(b\)-matching polytope revisited
- A unified approach to finding good stable matchings in the hospitals/residents setting
- The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications
- Fractional matching markets
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
- ``Almost-stable matchings in the hospitals/residents problem with couples
- Marriage market with indifferences: a linear programming approach
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- A 25/17-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem with one-sided ties
This page was built for publication: Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4286935)
