Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming

DOI10.1287/moor.18.4.803zbMath0806.90085MaRDI QIDQ4286935

John H. Vande Vate, Uriel G. Rothblum, Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 3 May 1994

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.4.803

zbMATH Keywords

core of marriage markets; stable marriage polytope

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C05: Linear programming

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

05C70: Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.)

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

90B80: Discrete location and assignment

91B68: Matching models

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